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Abstract: This paper evaluates the suitability of blockchain technology for the Article 6.2 carbon
market mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The bottom-up approach of the Paris Agreement causes
challenges to the robust accounting of mitigation outcomes and information asymmetry, both of
which result from a high number of heterogeneous emission accounting systems. Blockchain is an
innovative technology that can act as an aggregation platform for these fragmented systems while
enhancing transparency and automating accounting processes. However, this new technology is not
a panacea for all problems, and the trade-offs of applying blockchain technology need to be assessed
case by case. We create and apply an eight-step decision framework for testing the applicability of
the technology for the Paris Agreement Article 6.2 carbon market mechanism. The analysis shows
that, under current mechanism specifications, a blockchain application can enhance transparency and
increase automation, thereby eliminating information asymmetry. We outline a system architecture
that allows the linking of the heterogeneous systems, the integration of an Article 6.2 exchange
mechanism, and the progress tracking of climate targets. This blockchain architecture offers national
Parties the opportunity to co-create a decentralised system in line with the bottom-up ethos of the
Paris Agreement.
Keywords: Blockchain; decision framework; climate policy; carbon markets; Paris Agreement;
Article 6; permissioned; permissionless; Climate Warehouse
1. The Paris Agreement Carbon Market Mechanism
Cost-effective mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is crucial for limiting the global
temperature increase to well below 2 ◦C, the target set by almost 200 national Parties of the Paris
Agreement [1]. Carbon pricing is one of the most widely used policy instruments for cost-effective
GHG mitigation, with 57 GHG pricing initiatives globally in 2019 and 96 Parties considering to use
carbon pricing [2]. Approximately half of these initiatives use market-based mechanisms. The Paris
Agreement also outlines a market mechanism in Article 6.2 to promote the cooperation between Parties
in achieving their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) through internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes (ITMOs).
However, present carbon market mechanisms have limitations to the consistent provision
of transparency and robust accounting, compromising the environmental integrity of mitigation
actions [3–7]. Transparency in this context refers to the reporting and review of information related
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to the tracking of mitigation outcomes, and with enhanced transparency comes trust and confidence
in climate action [5]. Zhang et al. [8] (p. 290) divide the issues related to robust accounting into i)
validation of information (e.g. compliance with relevant rules or regulations), ii) the linkages among
different emission trading systems (e.g. domestic and international), and iii) the building of trusted
emission accounting systems. These issues have generally reduced accountability and compromised
the levels of trust and cooperation among the Parties [9,10].
In contrast to present carbon market mechanisms, Article 6.2 moves away from centralised
accounting, comprehensive rules and standardisation for the issuing and transferring international
units by offering decentralised cooperative approaches [5]. This bottom-up approach requires Parties
unilaterally to ‘ensure environmental integrity and transparency’ and to ‘apply robust accounting
to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting’ (Articles 6.2 and 6.3) [1,5]. The considerable
heterogeneity in emission accounting systems – leading to accounting challenges that result from diverse
information formats – magnifies the challenges associated with assessing, tracking, and comparing
Parties’ actions [5,11]. The mitigation outcome data in these systems are currently collected in a
variety of repositories, including spreadsheets, pipelines and registries, with diverse information
formats [12,13].
Blockchain technology, which constitutes an innovative approach to accounting and data
harmonisation, has the potential to overcome these challenges. Recently, blockchain technology
(also known as Distributed Ledger Technology, or DLT) emerged as a platform providing real-time,
verifiable and transparent accounting system. The general carbon markets literature considers
blockchain technology valuable in two application areas. First, blockchain could improve data
collection procedures and digitise the measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) processes of
mitigation actions [12,14–17]. Second, blockchain could serve as an aggregation platform, a ‘ledger of
ledgers’ or meta-registry, linking all heterogeneous emission systems in one platform (e.g. The ‘Climate
Warehouse’ proposed by the World Bank for linking national registries) [12,13,18–22].
Nonetheless, despite general agreement about blockchain potential, no study has yet
comprehensively evaluated a solution-problem fit. Given the evolving and changing nature of
the Article 6 rulebook [23–26], such an evaluation is key to understanding under what conditions a
blockchain application is beneficial and which rulebook changes might make a blockchain application
impractical. We extend the blockchain and carbon market literature by introducing a blockchain
decision framework to evaluate the technology’s applicability in Article 6.2. We base our evaluation
on the preliminary design options outlined in the Article 6.2 rulebook at the time of writing (May
2020). We synthesise ongoing environmental integrity and robust accounting discussions, the linking
of heterogeneous emission accounting systems, and extend the literature with a particular focus on the
bilateral transfer mechanism of ITMOs between Parties. In so doing, we provide a novel approach for
climate change policy-makers and practitioners to consider.
We also outline an alternative architecture – derived from our analysis of the Article 6.2 rulebook –
that resembles the bottom-up, decentralised ethos of the Paris Agreement and therefore may have an
invigorating effect on Article 6 negotiations. We had multiple discussions with subject matter experts
from the World Bank Technology and Innovation Lab (ITSTI) and the Carbon Markets and Innovation
Practice (CMI) team. These experts provided feedback on and insights into Article 6.2 accounting
challenges, the proposed blockchain architecture, and the co-creative development process.
The paper is divided into five parts. Section 1.1 introduces the accounting challenges to
safeguarding environmental integrity, and Section 1.2 presents general blockchain concepts and
practical approaches aimed at leveraging blockchain systems to carbon market mechanisms. Section 2
gives the blockchain decision framework and applies the eight classifiers to the Article 6.2 case study.
Section 3 outlines a blockchain-based architecture for the meta-registry and the Article 6.2 exchange and
discusses both the advantages and limitations of applying blockchain technology. Section 4 concludes
and discusses implications for future research.
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1.1. Safeguarding Environmental Integrity through Robust Accounting
To establish a functioning carbon market mechanism, the safeguarding of environmental integrity is
key [27–33]. Article 4.13 of the Paris Agreement explicitly states that ‘Parties shall promote environmental
integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency’ ([1], p. 3). Although
there are different interpretations between Parties of what environmental integrity encompasses,
there is general agreement that transparency and robust accounting are prerequisites to ensure unit
quality [5,29]. Article 4 and Article 13 provide general provisions for NDC accounting, and Article 6
provides specific provisions for the accounting of ITMO transfers between Parties. Schneider and La
Hoz Theuer [31] further specify the importance of establishing a robust accounting framework for ITMO
transfers, which prevents double-counting of GHG reductions, ensures appropriate corresponding
adjustments, and warrants correct accounting of the ITMO vintage [34].
Double counting occurs when a single ITMO is counted more than once towards NDCs
and non-state actor (NSA) targets. These NSAs comprise private actors such as companies,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and philanthropists, as well as public sub-national actors like
regions and cities [35]. Despite the unprecedented engagement of NSAs in the Paris Agreement [35,36],
NSA emission accounting is a significant challenge [37]. While previous versions of Article 6.2 and 6.3
stated that the transfer of ITMO by non-Parties (i.e., NSAs) must be authorised by participating Parties,
the reference of NSAs in the Article 6.2 rulebook was removed during the latest Conference of Parties
24 in Katowice [26,38].
Double counting can occur due to double issuance, the issuance of multiple units for the same
mitigation outcome; double claiming, i.e., counting the same unit towards multiple targets (e.g., for
NDC compliance markets and NSA voluntary markets); or double use, i.e., using a unit multiple times
towards a mitigation target [31]. Accounting issues can further arise due to differences in the NDC
target year of involved Parties [5,31,34]. These vintage problems occur when Parties with different
NDC target years, such as single-year targets and continuous multi-year targets, bilaterally transfer
ITMOs [28].
In addition, learnings from the Kyoto market mechanisms suggest that information asymmetry
between project proponents, regulators, and auditors caused an adverse impact on the accreditation of
project outcomes [4,34]. This asymmetry mainly originated from incomplete or not-existing key project
documents, such as monitoring and verification reports [3,4]. The Kyoto mechanisms demonstrated
that the transparency and availability of information for other actors, such as domestic institutions,
scientists, or civil society organisations, is critical to creating an effective market mechanism that
incentivises the transferring Party to adopt ambitious mitigation targets while simultaneously ensuring
unit quality [39,40]. These past experiences highlight the need for an accountability mechanism
that reduces information asymmetry to incentivise all Parties to contribute sufficiently ambitious
mitigation actions.
Given these problems, it is questionable if and how the newly defined Article 6.2 market mechanism
can consistently enforce environmental integrity and prevent the reoccurrence of Kyoto mechanism
failures with a conventional software and database architecture. Compared to the Kyoto mechanisms,
Article 6.2 poses significantly more complicated accounting challenges due to the heterogeneous
accounting systems and rules. For example, the accounting of ITMOs outside the scope of the host
countries’ NDC [5,41], the uncertain and complex definition of an ITMO metric, and the corresponding
adjustment process for the transfer of ITMOs [32,42]. A single and common ITMO metric would
be, for example, tCO2e, which could be issued in a registry and then traded multiple times while
ensuring comparability between mitigation outcomes [5]. However, ITMOs could also be defined as
non-GHG metrics, or as net flows between two Parties over a certain period [5,26,42]. The accounting
of mitigation outcomes outside the NDC scope and the different ITMO definitions lead to complex and
diverse corresponding adjustment approaches.
Corresponding adjustments are conducted on an emission-based or budget-based approach [5] and
require a coherent accounting basis (e.g., the NDC targets of the Parties involved). Parties participating
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in cooperative approaches should submit an initial report when receiving authorisation or conducting
the first ITMO transfer, possibly in conjunction with the next Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) [26].
Consecutive ITMO transfers are reported in the country’s next BTR and included in its NDC
accounting [42]. However, the dependence on BTRs for the ITMO transfers introduces significant
information asymmetry, as the initial BTRs are first due by the end of 2024 and then every two
years [7,43]. These BTRs are used as a key information source for the global stocktake (GST). The GST
is conducted in 5-year periods and aims to review and increase ambition over time [44]. The BTRs,
including the ITMO transfer information, are reviewed by the Article 6 technical expert review team
(TERT). The TERT assesses the reported information and drafts a technical review report providing
findings and recommendations for the Paris Agreement’s multilateral consideration of progress [7].
However, the cyclical reporting of BTRs and the GSTs, combined with heterogeneous accounting
systems and diverse methodologies, places a great burden on the limited TERT review capacity [7].
Consequently, Hanle at al. [7] argue for the ‘rethinking and redesigning’ of reporting procedures for all
Parties under the Paris Agreement. To improve these complex and predominantly manual accounting
procedures, a platform that links national registries, NSA accounting systems, the Article 6.2 exchange,
and the NDC target progress tracking under the TERT would therefore be highly beneficial.
1.2. Blockchain as an Aggregation Platform
Blockchain is an emerging technology that has reinvented data storage by distributing and
synchronising all transactions across the network of participants (i.e., nodes) [45]. Accordingly,
the transactions are not stored in a single centralised database but distributed equally across all network
nodes so that each participant holds a copy of all the data, i.e., the ledger [46]. The access of all nodes
to the entire history of transactions allows the nodes to both verify and publish new transactions on
the blockchain [47]. The blockchain consensus mechanism defines how the nodes achieve agreement
about a transaction to be added to the ledger [48]. The consensus mechanism evaluates whether the
transaction is valid, considering the state of the ledger, and conforms with the rules of the blockchain
network [48]. All new valid transactions are collected in a ‘block’, which is added to the ‘chain’ of
existing transaction blocks and cryptographically linked in chronological order [49]. Due to this
interlinked structure, the transaction history becomes immutable and tamper-resilient, as the altering
of a block requires the changing of all subsequent blocks [50].
Smart contracts establish verified automation within the blockchain system. Smart contracts are
computer protocols that enable automation of predefined rules when a particular condition is met [51].
They are formulated as ‘if this is true, then . . . ’ statements, which run on the blockchain and are execute
autonomously when the predefined conditions are satisfied [52]. Through this programmability,
smart contracts can automatically and consistently enforce regulations and methodologies to ensure
transparency and accountability [15]. In the context of carbon markets, smart contracts can support
the digitisation of MRV processes by automating the issuance and transfer of ITMOs [12]. During the
ITMO issuance, the smart contract can store a wide range of metadata on the ITMO token to enable
the traceability and unit quality assessment [19]. Such ITMO token metadata could, for example,
include the country of issuance, sectoral scope, project name and identification number, guidance and
methodology applied, and date of issuance (i.e. vintage). Furthermore, smart contracts can automate
the ITMO transfer mechanisms, which we detail in the subsequent sections.
For the collection and harmonisation of ITMO data, the last version of the Article 6.2 rulebook
outlines two centralised accounting and reporting platform, the ‘international registry’ and the
‘Article 6 database’ under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
secretariat [26]. Previous drafts of the rulebook included references to distributed ledger technology
(i.e., blockchain) as a possible technology [23,53], which were removed in subsequent iterations.
However, given the limitations and heterogeneity of present market accounting systems, the further
magnified accounting challenges under Article 6.2, and the decentralisation and bottom-up ethos of
the Paris Agreement, we suggest that a blockchain application should be further investigated.
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There exist several suggestions for blockchain-based mechanisms for the accounting and exchange
of mitigation outcomes related to Article 6 [18–20]. To the best of our knowledge, the Climate
Warehouse [13] proposed by the World Bank appears to be the most advanced solution. It establishes
a blockchain-based accounting platform to link heterogeneous accounting systems. This so-called
meta-registry connects country, regional, and institutional databases and registries to surface publicly
available information on mitigation outcomes. Through this, the Warehouse provides an international
platform to enhance transparency and trust among market participants and enable tracking of mitigation
outcomes across jurisdictions [12,13]. The Open Climate platform [22] acts as an integrator of climate
records to maintain a decentralised ‘ledger of ledgers’. This ledger develops climate communication
protocols to harmonise climate actor data—ranging from countries, to companies to individuals—to
provide transparency and accountability from the GST to the carbon pricing of mitigation outcomes [22].
Further examples for blockchain applications to enable the exchange of ITMOs are concepts and
solutions suggested by the Blockchain for Climate Foundation [54], the Poseidon Foundation [55] and
the AirCarbon Exchange [56].
These blockchain-based projects provide valuable experience and help to validate the technical
feasibility of blockchain for this case study. Through these experiences, they help to overcome the
legacy system thinking surrounding the Article 6.2 development, such as removing the DLT reference
from previous rulebook versions [23] or only discussing replacing one specific component of the legacy
system (e.g., the Kyoto International Transaction Log). This legacy thinking mainly leads to incremental
improvements and fails to utilise the full potential of this innovative technology. The challenges
and limitation presented in Section 1 clearly show that the legacy infrastructure will not be able to
cope with the scale and complexities introduced by the bottom-up approach of the Paris Agreement.
In the remainder of this paper, we argue that incremental improvements are insufficient to achieve
robust accounting. Instead, we need to ‘rethink and redesign’ the Article 6.2 mechanism architecture.
To develop this innovative architecture, we combine the learnings from the existing blockchain-based
project to create a holistic vision and overcome legacy limitations.
2. Blockchain Decision Framework for the Article 6.2 Market Mechanism
Compared to conventional centralised database systems, blockchain systems have considerable
costs and trade-offs in terms of, e.g., scalability, capacity and latency. Consequently, blockchains are
not a panacea for all applications but need to be carefully evaluated based on the specific case study
requirements [57]. In particular, blockchain resource disadvantages relative to database systems need
to be offset by the benefits of having a distributed and automated system. Hence, viable blockchain
technology case studies need to satisfy several characteristics. We integrate these ‘fit-considerations’
into a decision framework enabling a systematic evaluation of the Article 6.2 characteristics. As such,
our approach (Figure 1) builds on previously suggested frameworks [57–59] modified to fit the
requirements of the climate policy space.
The framework consists of eight classifiers in the form of the following questions: The framework
starts with testing the general applicability of a blockchain (classifiers 1 to 3), continues with technical
classifiers to determine blockchain performance requirements (4 to 6), and concludes with governance
and data-accessibility-related classifiers to identify the most suitable type of blockchain system
(classifier 7 and 8).
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Figure 1. Blockchain decision framework.
In the following, we discuss each classifier based on the case study requirements of the Article 6.2
carbon market mechanism.
2.1. Multiple Actors Contributing?
Arguably the greatest achievement of blockchain technology is the development of a consensus
mechanism that creates a consensus between a distributed network of nodes. A consensus must be
achieved even in case of conflicting data and untrusted network participants so that there is always
one single state of the ledger [60]. This distribution of data can eliminate single centralised points of
failure and information asymmetry [18,51,61–64].
In this ase stud , the blockchain acts as an aggregation platform that combines heterogeneous
emission accounting systems and enables ITMO transfers between a diverse group of participants.
The Article 6.2 system consists of four main groups of actors: The national Parties, the UNFCCC
secretariat, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary
Body for Implementation (SBI), and the TERT. 195 Parties signed the Paris Agreement [65]. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, 150 technical experts are selected by the secretariat out of a list of proposed experts
from the Parties [66], which provides an indication for the TERT. This variety of network actors creates
the necessary foundation of a distributed system. Given the uncertain accounting roles surrounding
the integration of NSAs, we assume that NSA mitigation outcomes are monitored and exchanged
through the respective national registry.
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2.2. Digitally Representable Asset?
Under Article 6.2, an ITMO can be defined as a unit, as an amount, as a net flow, or all three
forms interchangeably [42]. In all these forms, ITMOs are represented digitally as already happening
in most carbon markets and exchangeable against a monetary unit. In this case study, ITMOs are
represented on the blockchain as tokens that are used towards a mitigation target. The conceptual
benefits of a token are the automation and disintermediation of the transaction process, a faster and
more efficient clearing and settlement time, and the transparency and traceability of the complete
transaction history [67]. These tokens could be fungible, i.e., divisible and identical, or non-fungible,
i.e., unique and non-interchangeable.
Fungible tokens are favourable in case of a uniform system, e.g., cap-and-trade, where the ITMO
token is denominated in a single and common metric (e.g., tCO2e) and possibly traded multiple
times among Parties [5]. Each ITMO token has a similar unit quality, i.e., generated using defined
guidelines and methodologies, so that they are equal in terms of value and tradable like currencies.
Fungible tokens can store specific metadata on each ITMO token [19,68]. This metadata is automatically
inserted on each token by using smart contracts to ensure full information availability to the potential
token acquirer.
Non-fungible tokens could be applied in cases where not all ITMOs have an identical metric.
Due to the bottom-up nature and the present heterogeneity of accounting systems and markets, different
actors will likely apply different scopes, rules and standards for ITMO exchanges [5]. In this case,
non-fungible tokens are more suitable as they are not one-to-one exchangeable like a fungible token,
but represent each ITMO’s property and have varying unit qualities. Non-fungibility is the case when
different policy instruments (e.g., taxes, performance or technology standards) or different accounting
methodologies, cause the unique characteristics and value of each ITMO token [34]. There is also the
possibility of Parties using non-CO2 metrics [42].
2.3. Final State and Immutable Record?
At any point in time, an ITMO token can only have one owner – preventing conflicting ITMO
ownership between Parties – which could otherwise result in double counting. All transactions are
placed in sequential order on the blockchain, the history is immutable, and each ITMO can be traced
from the origination project to the ultimate usage towards an NDC target. The immutability of the
transaction record is an essential feature of blockchain technology and is the foundation for redefining
trust, based on the mathematics behind the technology [69,70]. As the blockchain expands at a linear
rate, tampering with a block in the chain would also require adjusting the hash of all subsequent blocks.
The further the block is away from the end of the chain, i.e., the present state, the more difficult it
becomes to change the information in the block. This tamper-resilience of historical transactions is
particularly relevant in the auditing context [47,71].
Immutability has the advantage of bringing consistency into the history of an asset, e.g., an
ITMO. Criticism against the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol included the lack of transparency
in the project documentation, implementation, and validation of mitigation activities [3,4]. Hence,
a permanent and immutable record is beneficial to enhance transparency and accountability. In an
immutable system, it is always possible to go back in time and retrace every single transaction to the
origin, which can be useful in case of fraudulent behaviours to trace all actors involved [47].
A final state is a precondition for the utilisation of smart contracts. For the creation of a smart
contract, the conditions and possible outcomes are hardcoded into the system. These rule-based
computer codes execute the encoded rules precisely as specified, without any possible ambiguity or
having a ‘spirit of the agreement’ [72]. As the mitigation activities in the final rulebook are explicit and
direct rules, almost everything specified in Article 6 can be encoded.
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2.4. High Transaction Volume?
Compared to a centralised database system, a blockchain system has reduced transaction
throughput, limiting the amount and velocity of data stored on-chain [57]. These are often described
as the blockchain scalability issue [73–75].
The storage of larger files and pictures poses a challenge to most blockchains as it increases data
synchronisation volumes. Based on the draft of the CMA [76] and experiences with past market
mechanisms like Kyoto and the EU-ETS, the information in reports are mainly text or tabular documents.
Franke et al. [77] estimate the peak volume to triple compared to the Kyoto mechanism, reaching
approximately 1.2 billion transactions annually. This annual volume translates to an average of
36 transactions per second, which can be supported by most blockchains. To further reduce the
requirements and avoid scalability issues, it is possible to store larger files in an off-chain database
repository [57,73]. The metadata stored on each ITMO token can include the specific link to this
off-chain repository. The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) could be used as such a repository [77].
2.5. Removing Intermediaries?
In a centralised database system, one or few network authorities govern the system and have
the authority to make decisions for the system. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
the UNFCCC hosted the CDM registry [78]. Despite the trust of the Parties in the UNFCCC, a central
authority can become a single point of failure or a bottleneck [18,51,61–64].
In current emission accounting systems, there are various manual steps and bottlenecks related to
the MRV and distribution of data that could be automated through blockchain and smart contracts,
to reduce transaction and administrative costs [79–81]. The interconnection of blockchain and other
emerging technologies might create innovative data collection approaches to support the Third Party
Verifiers (i.e., the Article 6 technical review team). Emerging technologies, like the internet of things
(IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), mobile and web applications can enhance MRV by automating
data capture from source (e.g., IoT sensors like smart meters [18]) or remotely (e.g., remote sensing
technologies, LIDAR, RADAR or even drone capture), and enhance datasets (through AI or machine
learning for data verification to identify data errors or fraudulent behaviours [82]) [12].
2.6. Conflicting Incentives of Actors?
Blockchain is a ‘distributed trust technology’ [83–85]. This trust is achieved through decentralised
data storage and governance, which is enabled through the participating nodes of the system [52,57].
The nodes in this case study are distributed across the actor groups of Article 6.2, i.e., national Parties,
the UNFCCC secretariat, SBSTA and SBI, and the TERT.
The setup of Article 6.2 requires a high level of trust among the Parties, as each Party is required
to submit their own ITMO data. There is an inherent economic incentive for Parties to overstate ITMO
supply, to either use them to achieve the NDC targets or sell them for a profit [86]. Based on experience
with the Joint Implementation (JI) Track 1 mechanism of the Kyoto mechanism, which had a similar
design to Article 6.2, several problems and grievances were leading to an overall poor environmental
integrity rating [3].
Accordingly, there is a strong case for implementing a blockchain-based system that offers enhanced
tamper-resilience and more robust transparency and auditability features to ensure unit quality against
the diverging incentives. Past problems under Kyoto, like double-counting or unit quality problems,
could be prevented by unambiguous guidelines and transparency that are programmed as smart
contracts into the system and automatically enforced. The formulation of these guidelines at the
political level is very challenging due to the diverse and often contradictory interests. Once guidelines
can be unambiguously formulated, smart contracts can be applied and automate enforcement.
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2.7. Public or Private Transactions?
After confirming all previous classifiers in favour of a blockchain application, the next two
classifiers examine the desired system governance design in terms of system transparency and
openness for participation. Blockchains can be distinguished in terms of public or private data access
and permissioned or permissionless rights to validate data or change the protocol [57]. On a public
blockchain like Bitcoin or Ethereum, all transactions can be viewed in public, whereas private
blockchains like Hyperledger Fabric or Corda require authorised reading access [51,57].
In this case study, there is a trade-off between the data confidentiality requirements of Parties and
the transparency importance underlying robust accounting and environmental integrity. To maximise
transparency and accountability, a public system, where all data are available, would hence be the
best solution. However, it is uncertain at this point if all national Parties’ and potentially NSAs
are willing to disclose all mitigation action data. While all mitigation project-related data under
the Kyoto mechanisms are publicly disclosed and available in the project design documents of the
UNFCCC homepage. A recent report from the CLI [14] states privacy issues and the access to
commercially sensitive data as a challenge for the implementation of blockchain in carbon markets.
The World Bank [13] expresses similar uncertainty regarding protecting the privacy of buyers and
sellers, specifically in hindsight of regulation like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of
the European Union. The GDPR requires all digital systems to obtain permissions for data utilisation
and sharing. However, it is questionable to what degree personal data will be recorded, and hence if
the GDPR is even applicable.
In the case in which the Parties prefer to restrict the visibility, a private transaction would be
possible. Technical encryptions methods as zero-knowledge proof and Zero-Knowledge Succinct
Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zkSNARK) might be of interest [87].
2.8. System Permissioning?
Similar to the transparency considerations described in the previous classifier, there are also
trade-offs regarding the degree of system permissioning. Contrary to public or private, however,
system permissioning is not a bivalent characteristic but a gradual property ranging from permissionless
and permissioned. Permissionless blockchain systems are fully decentralised, and anyone can become
a ledger node to validate data or even change the decision-making process of the protocol (if securing
sufficient support from other nodes) [19,48,57]. Conversely, a small number of entities control
permissioned systems, and only authorised entities may become a ledger node or participate in
transactions [19,50,57].
Generally, for a governmental system or a system with highly regulated actors, an open, permissionless
system is often too risky as the system is not controlled by the initiating actors [51]. However,
a permissioned system might conflict with the bottom-up ethos of the Paris Agreement [13,15,18,78].
On the other hand, Article 6.3 of the Paris Agreement [1] (p. 5) states that activities under Article 6.2
fall under the full responsibility of the Parties involved in the transfer. This responsibility indicates the
need for a certain permissioning of the system that is primarily aligned towards the national Parties
and potentially other actors like the UNFCCC secretariat, the SBSTA and SBI, and the TERT.
3. Discussions—Carbon Market Platform Architecture
In the decision framework evaluation, we show that a blockchain application for an Article 6.2
market mechanism is promising: classifiers 1 to 3 confirm the applicability of a blockchain, as the
carbon market network consists of a heterogeneous group of actors that will use the network to transfer
digital ITMO assets and benefit from a permanent and immutable transaction record. Classifiers 4
and 5 confirm that a blockchain can satisfy the case study performance requirements and lead to
efficiency gains and reduced administrative costs by removing intermediary steps through smart
contracts. In the future, the interlinkage with other emerging technologies can enhance transparency
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and efficiency through innovative digital MRV data procedures. Classifier 6 confirms the role of
blockchain technology as holding actors with diverging incentives accountable. The remaining two
classifiers, 7 and 8, concern the system design in terms of the degree of system transparency and
openness for participation. Adequate system design is not a technical question alone, but requires fit
to the preferences and requirements of the participating Parties individually and from the perspective
of the overall system ambition, as partly determined by the ongoing Article 6 rulebook negotiations.
As initially described, the new the blockchain-based Article 6.2 architecture assumes three
important functions (Figure 2): The first role is as a meta-registry for linking national Party registries
and NSA emission accounting systems. Second, the blockchain acts as an integrated exchange
platform for ITMO tokens to address the complex accounting challenges associated with corresponding
adjustments (as outlined in Section 1.1). Third, it serves as a tool for NDC compliance targets and
NSA voluntary mitigation targets, to provide real-time progress tracking towards the Paris Agreement
long-term goal.
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A blockchain application provides the most benefits if all three functions partake within the
same platform to ensure data harmonisation, robust accounting and eliminate information asymmetry.
Otherwise, there is a risk of creating additional data siloes and fragmentation in the already fragmented
legacy system. Based on the blockchain meta-registry, the Article 6.2 exchange allows for the bilateral
trading and settle ent of ITMO tokens between Parties and NSAs to comply with their c mpl ance or
voluntary mitigation targe s. This architecture enables the collec ive accounting of all transactions
by distributing and validating the meta-registry across the network of verified participants [88,89].
The blockchain automates double-entry bookkeeping of ITMO transfers between Parties, ensuring
that there is only one Party holding the ITMO at any time, eliminating the risk of double claiming and
double use. If two Parties conduct an ITMO transaction, the entire system of nodes (i.e., all Parties)
determines the authenticity of the transaction and conducts the appropriate corresponding adjustments
(e.g., of the NDC targets). If the transaction complies with the platform rules, the transaction is
validated, and the ledger of all nodes is collectively synchronised [88]. As activities under Article 6.2
fall under the full responsibility of the Parti s involv d in the t ansfer, t e acquiring Party is obligated
to assess and safeguard the unit quality and environmental integrity of the purchased ITMOs [5].
For this assessment, the metadata stored on each ITMO token (e.g., country and sector of origin, sector
and methodology) are crucial. This information is timestamped and immutable and can be retraced
retrospectively in case of disagreement between actors.
Lessons learned from Kyoto show that sole oversight of the market mechanism by the host
Parties alone is insufficient [4]. The involvement of other non-state reviewers, like domestic
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institutions, scientists or civil society organisations, is critical to creating an effective market mechanism
that incentivises the transferring Party to adopt ambitious emission targets to ensure unit quality.
This platform would also facilitate the work of the TERT and other auditors by providing complete
audit-related information in close to real-time [47], in comparison to the present every two- to five-year
reporting cycles of the BTRs and GSTs [7,43,44].
The blockchain platform eliminates information asymmetry once information has entered the
blockchain system. However, the blockchain suffers from the ‘garbage in/garbage out’ problem or
‘last-mile issue’ [12,14,51], meaning that the data input quality determines the data quality on the
blockchain. In legacy accounting systems, MRV is mostly carried out in manual processes, based on
disconnected data trails, spreadsheets and static reports [12,15,18,90,91]. Ideally, this process is
automated through emerging technologies and innovative digital MRV procedures. Particularly, the
replacement of manual data collection in the field would significantly increase system efficiency,
enhance the data quality, and reduce costs. Smart contracts play an essential role in improving the
system by automating the enforcement of MRV procedures and reducing data collection costs and
execution delays [47,49].
We acknowledge that the formulation of Article 6 accounting rules is a controversial issue, with the
disagreement between Parties causing stalling rulebook negotiations. At the current stage, Article 6
does not contain any reference to the engagement of stakeholders or the implementation of stakeholder
consultations [92]. Through this innovative and inclusive development approach, we outline an
alternative system that national Parties could shape and adopt in a bottom-up and co-creative approach.
This alternative is needed to overcome present technical and political barriers inhibiting the Article 6
market implementation. The blockchain-based architecture is flexible in the design and can be adjusted
based on changing Article 6.2 rulebook specification once the rulebook negotiations are concluded.
4. Conclusions and Future Research
This paper outlines an alternative blockchain-based architecture to address carbon market
challenges and limitations. For this, we present a decision framework to test the applicability of
blockchain technology to the emission meta-registry and specifically the Article 6.2 exchange. We found
that, for the bottom-up and decentralised governance system envisioned in the Paris Agreement,
a blockchain application is promising and can yield benefits in enhanced transparency and increased
automation. The technology enables a novel democratic governance system, providing each Party
with ownership of the system data to eliminate information asymmetry.
Although blockchain can address challenges, it is a nascent technology and not the panacea to
resolve all carbon market issues. The legacy market infrastructure comes with the advantage of being
tested and refined over a long time, e.g., the Kyoto mechanisms were implemented in 2005. However,
these mechanisms have clear limitations, being based on many manual steps and a centralised and
fragmented databank structure. The dependence on national BTRs (every two years) and the GSTSs
(every five years) for the assessment of ITMO transfers and progress tracking by the TERT maintains
or even aggravates the significant information asymmetry between the fragmented legacy accounting
systems. We therefore argue for the consideration of blockchain technology, despite it being a nascent
and largely untested technology, to overcome legacy system limitations. By aggregating all information
in the blockchain platform, the TERT and other relevant actors can have close to real-time data on the
status of national registries, NSA accounting systems and the transfer of ITMO between Parties.
When designing the Article 6.2 market mechanism, we suggest considering blockchain as an
innovative technology option. Otherwise, when only considering legacy database architectures, there is
the risk of designing a ‘new’ post-2020 market mechanism that is already outdated at the date of
inception. Integrating a blockchain platform offers clear benefits in terms of interoperability with
other emerging technologies, automating the process through smart contracts, enhancing transparency,
traceability and auditability, and enhancing system security and trust between Parties.
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The Article 6 rulebook negotiations show the complicated political dynamics, which make up the
background fabric on which our suggested approach is positioned. The success of this architecture
or any alternative approach is dependent on developing a clear and nuanced understanding of the
needs and interests of each Party. A sound understanding of Parties’ interests is needed for achieving
an innovative and valid system and governance design following a solution-problem fit. For future
research, we recommend a proactive and iterative development approach, where the Parties are actively
involved in a co-creating and inclusive system development. This approach allows for the testing of
different governance designs and can create a sense of ownership among the participating Parties.
From a policy perspective, we recommend stakeholder consultations to understand the design and
governance preferences within the implementation of cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 of
individual Parties. We further propose to consult the Parties to co-create the governance and system
design for full ownership in a bottom-up approach and to develop pilot projects, test technology
alternatives and refine them for this specific case study. The Paris Agreement has a decentralised and
bottom-up ethos, based on transparency, which is similar to the ethos of blockchain technology. Parties
of the Paris Agreement will ultimately decide if the blockchain will be adopted for their carbon market
system or not. Hence, it will be crucial to design the system not for the Parties but with them.
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